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In short, the argument that the single contractor is often a poor riskbearer and risk-shifter can be obviated if the lender who backs him is
also held strictly liable.
Under any extension of strict liability to the lender, the builder-vendor
should remain primarily liable since he is the one with the most immediate
control over the construction. Then the lending agency can protect itself
not only by spreading the risk through interest rates on loans and requiring
the borrower to insure against products liability, but can also seek indemnification from a solvent builder who builds a defective house, at
least if the builder was actively negligent.3 4 These methods of protection
might make courts less reluctant in the future to extend the Connor principle so that lenders financing builder-vendors are strictly liable for housing
defects.
When all arguments on the subject are examined, such vicarious strict
liability for lenders must rest on a social policy concept rather than on
a fault principle. But this is nothing new in the law of torts.
Vicarious liability is based on a relationship between the parties, irrespective of participation, either by act or omisson, of the one vicariously
liable, under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that
one person should be liable for the act of the other. Its true basis is
largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined
of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts
that, irrespective
35
of another.
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Torts-Municipal Corporations-Liability for Failure to Provide
Requested Police Protection Against-Assault by a Third Person
The doctrine of immunity for 'municipal corporations has long been
invoked to insulate municipalities from liability for the torts of their law
enforcement officials.' Even in those jurisdictions that have abolished
"See Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Strctueral Defects
in New Houtsing, supra note 3, at 760-61 & n.12 2 .
" Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 375-76, 110 N.W.2d 29, 34 (1961) (citations
omitted).
1On the doctrine of municipal immunity, see generally W. PROSSER, LAW or
TORTS 996-1013 (3rd ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. As to municipal

liability for the torts of law enforcement officials, see 18 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 53.79-53.81a (3rd ed. 1963); Comment, Municipal Liability for

Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 475 (1963).
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municipal immunity, however, a city does not become an insurer for those
who are injured by the acts or omissions of police officers. Rather, the
municipality is answerable in accordance with the same rules of law
applicable to individuals and private corporations.' Municipal liability
is thus imposed or limited by traditional concepts of tort law.
The recent case of Riss v. City of New York is illustrative. Plaintiff
was an attractive young woman who for more than six months had been
terrorized by threats from a rejected suitor. Her repeated pleas for police
protection were received with little more than indifference. Upon learning
that plaintiff had become engaged to another, the suitor once more threatened to have her killed or maimed, indicating that it was her "last
chance." Again the police refused to respond to her pleas for help. The
next day a hired thug threw lye in plaintiff's face. She was blinded in one
eye, lost a good portion of her vision in the other, and her face was
permanently disfigured. She was given around-the-clock police protection
for three and one-half years following the assault.
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a dismissal of the complaint, holding, despite a strong dissent, that police have no duty to
furnish requested protection against assaults by third parties to individual
members of the community. The failure to recognize such a duty was
obviously predicated upon a general fear of the burdensome consequences
that might ensue, and upon the uncertainty of whether liability based
upon such a duty could be held within reasonable bounds. In so holding,
the court failed to explore fully the relevant policy considerations. Moreover, in hinging its decision on the duty issue, it apparently did not consider the availability of other tort concepts that could be utilized to circumscribe the area of responsibility.
To merely state that there is or is not a duty would be, of course,
to beg the essential question of whether plaintiff's interests are entitled to
legal protection against the defendant's conduct.4 Although various
attempts have been made to define the factors that are relevant to the
determination of a legally recognizable duty, the question can be answered
2
E.g., Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, - Ind. -, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 .(1968). The New York
law abolishing municipal immunity consists of specific statutory enactments augmented by a broader decisional liability. See Bernardine v. City of New York, 294
N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945) ; Comment, Municipal Liability for Torts of Firevien, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 256 (1967).
' PROSSEr 332-33.
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only by an assessment of all policy considerations relevant to the factual
situation at hand.'
Difficulties of administration have always been of great significance
in any new development of the law,6 and fear of admittedly unpredictable
administrative consequences may have been a factor in the Riss decision.
It is significant to observe, however, that such fear of drastically increased caseloads and groundless suits has seldom materialized. 7 Yet, for
this reason, courts originally denied recovery for injuries resulting in
death s refused to allow recovery for nervous shock unless accompanied
by a physical impact,9 and denied protection to injured consumers of
manufactured products in the absence of privity of contract with the
manufacturer.' 0 Undeniably the cumulative effect of recognizing these
interests has had a significant impact upon the administrative burden of
the courts, but in no single instance has the resultant burden been in
proportion to the fears that it engendered. Furthermore, the existence
of modern procedural devices makes it increasingly improbable that unmeritorious actions can survive."
'The ultimate question is whether such a duty should be imposed as a matter
of policy. This in turn will depend upon the balancing of several factors,
namely the burden it would put on defendant's activity; the extent to which
the risk is one normally incident to the activity; the risk and the burden to
plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the two parties;
the prevalence of insurance in fact ....
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES].

' See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014,
1044-45 (1928). See also Comment, Muenicipat Immunity for the Torts of Police
Officers in South Dakota, 11 S.D.L. REv. 87 (1966), where it is stated:
The initiation of municipal liability would ultimately result in an increase
in the number of suits brought in local courts and might possibly stimulate
false claims. Such an increase could overload our present judicial system and
swamp the courts in a sea of litigation ....
Id. at 98.
See Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 351 (1957). Dean Leon Green has suggested that courts have overestimated
the number of cases that may be attributed to the negligence of governmental employees. Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REv. 369 (1944).
'E.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265
(1856); Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, (K.B. 1808).
°Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bosley
v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
"E.g., Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907); Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921); Heizer
v. Kingsland & Douglas Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S.W. 630 (1892).
" Modem pre-trial and discovery procedures should aid in the weeding out of
groundless suits. Furthermore, prompt notice is normally a condition precedent to
a suit against a municipality and should serve to thwart the malingering plaintiff.
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In addition to the administrative considerations involved in carving
out new areas of tort liability, the relative economic burdens to which the
litigants may be subjected have concerned the courts.' The fear of
potentially unbearable financial burdens that might be thrust upon
municipalities has been a major factor in perpetuating the doctrine of
municipal immunity.' 3 Furthermore, even where the immunity doctrine
has been abolished, courts have continued to fret over the specter of a
depleted municipal treasury. 14 Yet empirical studies indicate that the imposition of tort liability has not saddled municipalities with as great a
financial burden as was feared.'" Of course, if recognition of a duty to
provide police protection against personal assaults would seriously jeopardize the public treasury, such a duty should be denied.
It appears that courts, in assessing the potential economic impact,
may have failed to distinguish between those losses attributable to the lack
of adequate police protection and those involving a failure to provide fire
protection. Such a comparison is imprecise at best. Municipal liability
for fire damage could well become a crushing financial burden in the
event of a conflagration. Moreover, fire insurance is widely held by
property owners and, in comparison with the cumbersome process of
imposing legal liability upon a city, may represent a more economical
way to administer fire losses.' 6 On the other hand, while personal accident
insurance normally covers injuries intentionally inflicted by others,' 7 it is
unlikely that the coverage would be sufficient to compensate for serious
injury or death. Furthermore, it may be that those who need such insurance the most are least likely to hold it.'8
The possibility that a duty to provide police protection against per12 "Finally... judges give attention to the parties before them. They place the
loss where it will be felt the least and can best be borne." Green, The Duty Problem
in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 256 (1929).
1" See Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Snall Municipalities, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
" E.g., Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
" See Antieau, supra note 7; Warp, supra note 13.
" HARPER & JAMES § 18.6, at 1053; cf. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463, 513 (1963).
145
C.J.S. Insurance § 772 (1955).
10 National victimization rates indicate that the risk of criminally inflicted personal injury is considerably greater for those persons in lower income groups. THE

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 19 (1967). Because of their eco-

nomic status (and perhaps other cultural factors), these individuals are less likely
to carry personal accident insurance.
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sonal injury, once recognized, might easily be extended to include a duty
to protect against property loss, may be another factor in perpetuating
fears of drastic financial burdens. However, the availability and practicality of property insurance, as distinguished from accident insurance,
may also provide a rational basis for limiting liability for failure to
provide police protection to those instances that involve personal injury.
In addition, the municipality could insure against liability and spread the
cost of premiums among the taxpaying public.
In refusing to recognize a duty to provide police protection because
of the potential administrative and economic consequences, courts have
apparently ignored the existence of other tort principles-principles that,
given the existence of the duty, could still be used to hold liability within
reasonable bounds.' 0 Negation of the doctrine of municipal immunity does
not contemplate the imposition of absolute liability; those seeking recovery
must still satisfy the traditional elements of a negligence action. In addition to the establishment of a duty, plaintiff must also show a failure
to exercise reasonable care in the performance of that duty. The application of a standard of reasonable care to the operation of a municipal police
department would require that all circumstances be taken into consideration. The gravity of the foreseeable harm, the resources and other responsibilities of the police, the probability of injury, and the extent of
protection necessary to prevent the injury would all be relevant factors.2"
Furthermore, given the duty and the breach of that duty, plaintiff must
also establish a causal relationship between the breach and the injury,
often in itself a formidable task. The availability of these traditional
tort concepts, therefore, may be adequate to circumscribe the area of
responsibility.
Quite apart from administrative and economic considerations, courts
may rely upon the traditional dichotomy between misfeasance and nonfeasance to deny the existence of a duty to provide police protection against
personal assault.F1 The distinction between active misconduct working
positive injury, and passive inaction or failure to protect from harm, is
" Comment, Municipality Liable for Negligent Failure to Protect Informer: The
Schuster Case, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 503 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 59 CoLum.
L. REV.].
20
Id. at 503.
21
E.g., Murrain v. Wilson Lines, Inc., 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E.2d 29 (1947) (although municipal immunity
had been waived by statute,.municipality not liable for failure to provide police protection).

1969]

LIABILITY IF POLICE FAIL TO PROTECT

1003

law.22

Various rationalizations have been
deeply rooted in the common
most
of which appear to be a product of
offered to explain the distinction,
the extreme individualism characteristic of Anglo-Saxon legal thought.2 3
It has been said that active conduct creates a new risk, while mere inaction fails to alter the status quo ;24 that one should provide for his own
protection; and that forcing affirmative conduct places a more serious
restraint upon personal freedom than imposing limitations on one's liberty
to act. 5 A further, and perhaps more rational, justification for refusing
to recognize a duty of affirmative action is the difficulty of imposing
liability upon a particular individual when all members of a group have
had the opportunity and failed to act.26
The misfeasance-nonfeasance rule is not without exception. A duty
imposed by statute or charter has in some instances given rise to liability
for a failure to act. For example, persons injured in automobile accidents
have recovered upon the theory that the state failed to perform its statutory duty to maintain safe highways.17 Liability has been denied, however, in cases where the cause of action is based upon a statutory or
charter-imposed duty to provide police services.28 The courts usually
attempt to explain the distinction upon the rather dubious theory that the
duty to maintain highways inures to the benefit of the individual members
of a particular class of persons, while the duty to provide police protec29
tion runs to the general public rather than particular individuals.
Additional theories have been utilized to undercut the nonfeasance
rule. Courts have held that a duty to act may be created by the existence
of a special relationship between the parties ;3o that one who gratuitously
undertakes to render aid to another is under a duty to continue, unless
withdrawal of such assistance would leave the other in a position no
worse than when the aid was initially extended ;31 and that a duty to act
2' PROSSER 334-46; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Comment, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58
YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
2 Bohlen, szpra note 22, at 220.
24 PROSSER 334; Bohlen, supra note 22, at 220-21.
" Comment, Affirmative Duties in Tort, supra note 22, at 1288.
PROSSER 336-37.
'E.g., Eastman v. State, 278 App. Div. 1, 102 N.Y.S.2d 925, afi'd, 303 N.Y.

22'

691,2'103
N.E.2d 56 (1951).
59 CoLtm. L. REV. at 492.
2

0Id.
" See generally HARPER & JAMES § 18.7; HARPER & KImE, The Ditty to Control
the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
"2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§§ 323-24 (1965).
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may be found when one's prior conduct has created a risk of harm to
another. 2 In Schuster v. City of New York,3" these exceptions were
applied in order to impose liability for failure to provide police protection. After recognizing Willie "the Actor" Sutton, an escaped criminal,
Schuster promptly notified the police. After Sutton's arrest the police
publicly acknowledged Schuster's role in effectuating the capture. Following telephone calls that threatened physical violence, Schuster was shot
to death on a public street by unidentified persons. A decision affirming
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action was reversed, on the theory that plaintiff's performance of his
public "duty" to aid in the apprehension of a criminal gave rise to a
reciprocal governmental duty to exercise reasonable care for his protection, or alternatively, that the city had a duty to continue the partial protection that had been extended. It has also been suggested that the publicity acknowledging Schuster's role in the capture could have been classified as prior conduct that created a risk of harm, thus giving rise to a duty
to provide protection.3"
One eminent commentator has suggested that Schuster could have
been decided on the theory of a duty to exercise control over the conduct
of third persons.3 5 Courts have applied such a rule to impose an obligation upon common carriers to protect their passengers from the wrongful
conduct of third persons, 6 and, in addition, the rule has been applied
to such relationships as innkeeper-guest,3 7 employer-employee,38 jailerprisoner, 9 and school-pupil.4" Admittedly, the opportunity to control the
potential wrongdoer in these relationships is inherently greater than that
32

Id. § 321.
" 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958). The Riss court cited

and distinguished the Schuster case: "Quite distinguishable, of course, is the situation where the police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members
of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to the risks which then
materialize into actual losses . . . ." Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
240 N.E.2d 860, 861, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1968).
59 COLUM. L. Ruv. at 495.
"PROSSER 344-45.
"'E.g., Birmingham Elec. Ry. Co. v. Driver, 232 Ala. 36, 166 So. 701 (1936);
Kline v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 146 Wis. 134, 131 N.W. 427 (1911).
"'E.g., Fortney v. Hotel Bancroft, Inc., 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544
-,

(1955).
3

" E.g., David v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 328 Mo. 437, 41 S.W.2d 179 (1931).
"E.g., Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935).
'E.g., McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360

(1953).
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which exists in the context of a police protection case.4 1 But this distinction overlooks the fact that controlling the conduct of wrongdoers is the
very essence of police work. Furthermore, if the opportunity to exert
control over a potential wrongdoer is a factor to consider, then Riss, a
case in which the identity of the plaintiff's suitor was known, becomes
a stronger case for recognition of the duty than Schuster, where the party
who made the threatening calls was unidentified.
Although the duty to protect was recognized in Schuster, it is clear
that a plaintiff such as in Riss could not avail himself of either the
"assumption of duty" or the "prior dangerous conduct" exceptions to
the nonfeasance rule. Moreover, the New York court was obviously unwilling to find a special relationship--one that had been afforded to
Schuster because of his status as an informer. The nonfeasance rule
should not, however, be sacrosanct. It would seem that many of the
justifications traditionally advanced for the distinction do not apply to
4
a failure to provide police protection against assault 'y a third person. 1
The common law attitude of individualism, which r,.garded men as independent and self-reliant, should perhaps be tempered by the realization
that, notwithstanding one's ruggedness, there may be occasions when
preservation of life is dependent upon the affirmative action of the
police.4 3 Moreover, the rationale that regards the imposition of an affirmative duty to act as a serious encroachment upon individual liberty surely
has no application to members of an institution charged with maintenance
of the public safety. Even the most rational justification-the difficulty
of imposing liability upon one of several who failed to render aid is
clearly inapplicable.
Considering the inapplicability of the traditional nonfeasance rules, it
therefore seems quite plausible to argue that the potentially catastrophic
individual loss brought about by a clear failure to protect life should
weigh more heavily than the more remote possibility of serious administrative consequences or economic loss to the municipality.
JAMES

G.

BILLINGS

41 See Note, Torts: Municipal Corporation'sLiability for Failure to Perform
Governmental Acts, 47 CAL. L. REv. 409, 412 (1959).
42 59 COLUr. L. REv. at 502.
Cf. Hale, Prina Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 CoLum.

L.
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196, 214 (1946).

